In the name of God, the Most Compassionate, the Most Merciful,. Here is the updated version of the Google Earth project mapping all the infrastructure of the Zionist regime. Use the link below to view it. [

RT @BasedQizilbash: Below is a thread of all the Iranian strikes on Israel that I’ve geolocated from the 12-Day War. Continuation in the c….

10/ Geolocation of a strike that hit a power substation in Ashdod.

9/ Geolocation of an impact site in Be’er Sheva.

8/ An impact near a reactor at Haifa refinery, resulting in a fire that burned for multiple days.

7/ Geolocation of a relatively new air defense site in Tel Aviv, identified during the recent 12-Day War by open source analysts, it was targeted but not hit.

6/ This strike hit a power substation and a sewage treatment plant in Tel Aviv.

5/ Haifa City Hall was likely the target, but the missile missed and hit a building about 500 meters away.

4/ A strike hit the courtyard shared by the Knesset and Interior Ministry offices, right next to the Ministry of Interior in Haifa.

3/ Multiple successful strikes on the Glilot military intelligence complex in Tel Aviv, near the Mossad HQ.

2/ Destruction of an air defense system in Haifa, likely an Iron Dome, though some say it could be an Arrow-2/3.

1/ Destruction of an air defense system in Tel Aviv, likely an Iron Dome.

Below is a thread of all the Iranian strikes on Israel that I’ve geolocated from the 12-Day War. Continuation in the comments below ⬇️

RT @BasedQizilbash: There are rumors that Iran is acquiring Chinese air defense systems, the HQ-9B, HQ-16, and FK-2000. Naturally, they’ll….

That’s the end of the thread. Just wanted to share my personal thoughts. Of course, this is all hypothetical, not confirmed.

Now, about the FK-2000 SHORAD (25 km range) — since these are mobile, we can’t assume fixed positions. Best to place them on towers near HQ-9BE sites to protect against sabotage like quadcopters. Towers reduce radar blind spots through elevation. See the comparison below.

The HQ-16s are also affected by blind spots, but definitely less than the HQ-9BEs (HQ-9Bs). Below are a few examples — I won’t attach all six radar coverage tests.

Moving on to the LY-80s, domestically called HQ-16s by China, these systems have shorter range but are less vulnerable to sabotage. Each battery holds more missiles, perfect for protecting key sites like Shahroud and Semnan, and for covering individual cities.

However, Iran’s geography significantly reduces the effectiveness of these systems, leaving them vulnerable to insider threats like NLOS missiles and FPV drones. Below are radar coverage tests for each battery, with the legend in the bottom right.

Looking just at the HQ-9BE (HQ-9B) batteries, they cover most of Iran’s central region, including key cities like Isfahan, Shiraz, and Tehran, as well as important UGFs, nuclear, and space facilities.

Here’s a general map showing how Iran could deploy their future HQ-9BEs [HQ-9Bs] and LY-80s [HQ-16s]. This scenario assumes Iran has 4 HQ-9BE batteries and 6 LY-80 batteries. Legend at the top right shows the range details.