1/6 Paul Bacon and I have a new paper out in The Pacific Review. We tackled a puzzle: how do you analyze something like the "Indo-Pacific" using Regional Security Complex Theory when it's way too big to be a normal region? 🧩 https://t.co/VO36Vnr9Je

How NZ can survive – and even thrive – in Trump's new world of great-power rivalry

NZ is already successfully managing strong relationships with China and the US. By building on its Pacific influence, it can chart a carefully non-aligned course. @1nrsmith @UCNZ

1/6 Paul Bacon and I have a new paper out in The Pacific Review. We tackled a puzzle: how do you analyze something like the "Indo-Pacific" using Regional Security Complex Theory when it's way too big to be a normal region? 🧩 https://t.co/VO36Vnr9Je

With my academic career at a crossroads, I have been trying to quantify (and benchmark) my research performance and impact. I have updated my personal website with the fruits of my labour: https://t.co/JFrI6L1sNT

Publication alert: our book on #Europe's #IndoPacific Pivot is out! Coauthored with my brilliant colleague @GoranaGrgic, it assesses Europe's diverse approaches to the IndoPac with 10 case studies It's published by @Palgrave in Open Access 🔓 A short 🧵 https://t.co/cIvU9xULAK

‘The Indo-Pacific as a macrosecuritized constellation: revising Regional Security Complex Theory for the age of the Indo-Pacific.’ New article by @1NRSmith and Paul Bacon (@Tokyokel1) ⤵️

A recent commentary from me and Paul Bacon

The takeaway: NZ's foreign policy independence isn't exceptional - it's circumstantial. As regional geopolitics become more constrained, expect NZ to align more closely with traditional allies, regardless of which party is in power. (8/8)

This challenges the idea that NZ is inherently an "independent power." Instead, NZ has been fortunate to reside in a geopolitically calm region for decades - a "blessing of distance" that's now shrinking as great power competition intensifies. (7/8)

The theoretical insight: When regional geopolitics are "permissive," NZ can afford to be independent. When they become "restrictive" (like today's Indo-Pacific competition), systemic pressures override domestic preferences for independence. (6/8)

Case 2: NZ's AUKUS consideration. The Sixth National Government is exploring joining AUKUS Pillar II - a major shift toward alignment with US/Australia. Why? Because the regional security environment has become much more restrictive. (5/8)

Case 1: The 1980s nuclear ban. Yes, NZ stood up to the US - but this happened during a period of relative geopolitical calm in the Asia-Pacific. Cold War tensions had eased, China was opening up, and there were few external threats to NZ. (4/8)

Using a type II neoclassical realist framework, I argue that NZ's regional geopolitical setting is the PRIMARY driver of its foreign policy - not its "independent" role identity. The independence is real, but it's dependent on having geopolitical room to maneuver. (3/8)

The common narrative: NZ has maintained an independent foreign policy since the 1980s, standing up to superpowers when needed (like banning nuclear ships despite US pressure). But this misses the bigger picture about what drives NZ's foreign policy choices. (2/8)

I have a new paper out in Global Studies Quarterly: "Dependently Independent: Theorizing New Zealand's 'Independent' Foreign Policy via a Neoclassical Realist Lens" https://t.co/ogUE97wfsc TL;DR: NZ's "independent" foreign policy depends heavily on regional geopolitics. (1/8)

Dear @ole_waever, I just wanted to express my admiration of the work you and Barry have done over the years. This collaboration is a spinoff of a larger collaboration that celebrates 20 years since Regions and Powers.

6/6 Main contribution: showing how RSCT can handle mega-concepts like Indo-Pacific without losing its regional focus. Macrosecuritization bridges the gap between local and global security dynamics! 🌉

5/6 The framework helps explain why some states (New Zealand) got pulled in, others (China) actively resist, and still others (ASEAN, Pacific Islands) try alternative framings. Different responses to the same macrosecuritization 🔄

4/6 This produces what we call a "macrosecuritized constellation" - not erasing existing regional dynamics, but overlaying them with higher-order security competition. Think Cold War but not as successful 🌟

3/6 We argue the Indo-Pacific represents macrosecuritization in action: a coordinated effort by major powers to securitize China as an existential threat to international order, creating pressure on other states to choose sides 📡