Recently I discovered a one-click RCE vulnerability in #Azure that affects Function apps, App services, and Logic apps. The vulnerability enables attackers to fully take over the targeted victim's application and managed identity token. This is the story of #EmojiDeploy ._. 🧵

With 𝐚 𝐭𝐨𝐭𝐚𝐥 𝐨𝐟 ~18 vulnerability reports across popular Google Cloud products, including several critical and high-severity issues, I’m excited to share that I earned 2nd place in the latest Google LHE! . Huge thanks to the @GoogleVRP team and all the researchers.

👻This is GerriScary: a vulnerability I discovered in Google's Gerrit that allowed to hack several projects and affected 18 Google projects including ChromiumOS (CVE-2025-1568), Chromium, Bazel, and Dart. Dive into the full details here:.

Recently got back from Google’s bugSWAT LHE event in Tokyo 🇯🇵 - focused on AI, and what an experience!.Met old friends, made new ones, and even found some valid vulns in Gemini and other AI products. Can’t wait to the next Cloud bugSWAT in a month!.A big thanks to @GoogleVRP

RT @sivaneshashok: Published a write up on a couple of RCEs @kl_sree @asterfiester and I found in Google Cloud products. We got a $10k bou….

Say hi to ConfusedComposer😵‍💫- a fresh GCP privilege escalation vuln I discovered in Cloud Composer. This one is a variant of ConfusedFunction, which some of you might remember from my previous blog and recent talks. Shoutout to the @GoogleVRP team :).

🏃‍♂️Meet ImageRunner: A privilege escalation vulnerability I discovered in GCP Cloud Run. Thank you for the @GoogleVRP team for working closely with us on this one. *Stay tuned for more blogs to come!.

My Black Hat talk recording “The GCP Jenga Tower: Hacking Millions of Google’s Servers With a Single Package (and more)” is up! .Feel free to watch it and enjoy ;).

RT @shellyraban: Thanks for featuring my DSLs attack techniques research!.Read all about it in our blog-.

It was a pleasure to speak at the Intent Summit✅

Special thanks to the amazing @GoogleVRP and the team for the opportunity :).

Google’s BugSWAT and SecTor were unforgettable:. 🔝Awarded top Google vulnerability researcher for 2024 with 7 other amazing minds.💻Intense, live-hacking Google, including sleepless nights with the best researchers.🎁Presented my research at SecTor in Canada

Feel free to read the full research story in the CloudImposer blog: (11/11)🧵.@TenableSecurity .

That was wild. Until an unknown PyPI guardrail has stopped me. (10/11)🧵

I uploaded my "malicious" package with the same name and version to PyPI, and voila --> hundreds of requests from Google internal servers, validating that I actually ran code on them! (9/11)🧵

Turns out that even when pip encounters 2 packages with the same name and the same version, it STILL prioritizes PyPI, the public registry (8/11)🧵

Not so fast, this is a unique case-study, since this package is version pinned when installed in the Composer service (7/11)🧵

I found 1 Google internal packages that is missing from PyPI. What if I could upload a package with the exact same name to PyPI and hijack it? (6/11)🧵.

With the dependencies list in hand, and by revealing how the package installation works on each and every GCP Composer image, I could execute the attack (5/11)🧵.

Dependency Confusion was first discovered by @alxbrsn and allows attackers to hijack a package installation process by uploading a package with the same name and a higher version to the public registry (4/11)🧵

The following Composer's documentation sparked my curiosity. Dependency Confusion attack technique anyone? (3/11)🧵