2. Each divine person is God because his nature is the single divine nature. So:
โ The Father is God, because his nature is the divine nature.
โ The Son is God, because his nature is the divine nature.
โ The Spirit is God, because his nature is the divine nature.
3. Each divine person is the divine nature + a property. So:
โ The Father is the divine nature + unbegottenness.
โ The Son is the divine nature + begottenness.
โ The Holy Spirit is the divine nature + procession.
4. The divine nature's unity is not a specific unity, but a numerical unity.
As such, the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are not three instances of a common (specific) nature, but numerically one and the same nature.
Rather, the nature of the Father is numerically one and the same as the nature of the Son, which is one and the same as the nature of the Holy Spirit.
Hence, by nature, the divine persons are not three gods, but one God.
5. The personal properties by which the divine persons differ from each other are ontological modes of subsistence. So:
โ The Father's unbegottenness is a mode of subsistence.
โ The Son's begottenness is a mode of subsistence.
โ The Spirit's procession is a mode of subsistence.
As such:
โ The Father is God subsisting unoriginately.
โ The Son is God subsisting originately.
โ The Holy Spirit is God subsisting processively.
6. There is no logical impossibility in the one divine nature subsisting according to three modes of subsistence. (I.e. a triple mode of subsistence is not repugnant to the notion of the nature as such.)
7. So, as we see, the doctrine of the Trinity can be set out straightforwardly, without any hint of logical contradiction.
In short, there is no "logical problem of the Trinity."