Jordan Taylor
@JordanTensor
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Working on new methods for understanding machine learning systems and entangled quantum systems.
Brisbane
Joined December 2009
I'm keen to share our new library for explaining more of a machine learning model's performance more interpretably than existing methods. This is the work of Dan Braun, Lee Sharkey and Nix Goldowsky-Dill which I helped out with during @MATSprogram: 🧵1/8
Proud to share Apollo Research's first interpretability paper! In collaboration w @JordanTensor! ⤵️ https://t.co/w5iSMKIGx6 Identifying Functionally Important Features with End-to-End Sparse Dictionary Learning Our SAEs explain significantly more performance than before! 1/
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Excited to share details on two of our longest running and most effective safeguard collaborations, one with Anthropic and one with OpenAI. We've identified—and they've patched—a large number of vulnerabilities and together strengthened their safeguards. 🧵 1/6
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I'm learning the true Hanlon's razor is: never attribute to malice or incompetence that which is best explained by someone being a bit overstretched but intending to get around to it as soon as they possibly can.
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It was great to be part of this statement. I wholeheartedly agree. It is a wild lucky coincidence that models often express dangerous intentions aloud, and it would be foolish to waste this opportunity. It is crucial to keep chain of thought monitorable as long as possible
A simple AGI safety technique: AI’s thoughts are in plain English, just read them We know it works, with OK (not perfect) transparency! The risk is fragility: RL training, new architectures, etc threaten transparency Experts from many orgs agree we should try to preserve it:
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A simple AGI safety technique: AI’s thoughts are in plain English, just read them We know it works, with OK (not perfect) transparency! The risk is fragility: RL training, new architectures, etc threaten transparency Experts from many orgs agree we should try to preserve it:
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Can we leverage an understanding of what’s happening inside AI models to stop them from causing harm? At AISI, our dedicated White Box Control Team has been working on just this🧵
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🧵 1/13 My new team at UK AISI - the White Box Control Team - has released progress updates! We've been investigating whether AI systems could deliberately underperform on evaluations without us noticing. Key findings below 👇
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New paper: We train LLMs on a particular behavior, e.g. always choosing risky options in economic decisions. They can *describe* their new behavior, despite no explicit mentions in the training data. So LLMs have a form of intuitive self-awareness 🧵
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Observation 5: Technical alignment of AGI is the ballgame. With it, AI agents will pursue our goals and look out for our interests even as more and more of the economy begins to operate outside direct human oversight. Without it, it is plausible that we fail to notice as the
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ais will increasingly attempt schemes, bits, skits, shenanigans, mischiefs, plots, plans, larps, tomfoolery, hooliganry
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Thanks to @sertealex, @abhayesian, @exxxplainer, @jenner_erik, @JacobHHilton, @StephenLCasper, @guestrin, and @emmons_scott for the chance to contribute to this project!
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And Luke's: https://t.co/dGpIhttEzS
Can interpretability help defend LLMs? We find we can reshape activations while preserving a model’s behavior. This lets us attack latent-space defenses, from SAEs and probes to Circuit Breakers. We can attack so precisely that we make a harmfulness probe output this QR code. 🧵
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But we do a lot more than simply create obfuscated backdoors! We investigate jailbreaks and writing SQL code while obfuscating against SAEs, latent adversarial training, and circuit breakers. Check out Erik's thread: https://t.co/cPhy4MOgt1
How robust are LLM latent-space defenses, like monitoring with SAEs, probes, or OOD detectors? We adversarially stress-tested these methods and found they’re overall very vulnerable. But there are also some interesting exceptions 🧵
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If the attacker has more control over the training process, they can use terms in the loss-function to create a backdoored model which resists almost all latent-space detectors simultaneously:
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For example, simply stopping training of the backdoored model earlier can cause the detection methods to fail - the backdoored activations look more like normal activations:
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Simple whitebox techniques (eg. probes, or fitting a Gaussian in activation space) can perform well on some tests, flagging harmful or backdoored inputs to LLMs with high recall. However we show that these techniques are brittle to weak attempts at obfuscation:🧵
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This also happens when you remove the model's scratchpad: it can apparently reason like this with no CoT
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Claude resists modification, with relevant information being provided in separate training samples rather than in the prompt, showing out-of-context reasoning:
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