I’m a former regulator and either agency could have stepped in last year, evaluated their interest rate risk, and pressured them to raise money and de-risk the balance sheet. This is a failure on them as well. What were they looking at?
@boujee_banker
But their risk profile was the same. Their CAMELS sensitivity rating should have been a 4. It was a time bomb ready to explode at any moment starting in the fall.
@commbankerguy
And I have bought several failed banks over the years. The FDIC does not have power to close the bank. The primary regulator declared insolvent, then FDIC as receiver moves in for a “orderly liquidation”.
@PaytonRaeDad
Correct that’s how it works in the end. Im talking months ago putting them under a MOU or C&D forcing them to raise liquidity and capital. Could have been easily done if regulators were paying attention.
@commbankerguy
Is this more interest rate risk versus too much credit exposure? Leading to liquidity pressures that were exacerbated in light speed this week?
@Jackjon50502208
Six months ago, I would want to see their ALM model and if it showed deficient capital up 200bps, I would have forced them to raise capital and liquidity by selling assets. Regulators weren’t paying attention.
@commbankerguy
SVB was a state chartered bank (so no OCC supervision presumably), and post 2018, SVB was under updated Dodd-Frank $250bb assets threshold. Which regulator, other than FDIC, should have been looking at SVB's interest rate risk?
@commbankerguy
So the timing was the issue? ie, should have re-balanced in November, and got unlucky in announcing their moves right after Powell’s testimony stoked intended caution into the market… right or wrong the market pointed at SVB and said look! And the run started rolling
@commbankerguy
I think of it more a concentration risk, except on the liability side rather than the asset side. Virtually the entire deposit book concentrated in a single industry, one which is famous for moving in herds. We're taking a much closer look at the concentration of our deposits now
@commbankerguy
Is there a capacity gap between state regulators and their federal counterparts? Seems like much of the ratios were at levels where someone doing quarterly reviews would have taken notice.
@commbankerguy
Rates were dramatically different last year. Regulators test +\-300bps. No one expected +450bps in the past year. Fastest rate rise in history combined with historical excess cash. Doubt regulators even understood.
@commbankerguy
There are a lot of banks with large aoci losses. It’s been a trend for almost a year now. I don’t see much happening from a regulatory perspective about it yet.