In response to UEFA's concerns about state meddling in football, Sir Keir Starmer has said that the new football regulator will be "truly independent" of central government. Will it? I explore the trade-offs and options in a new article for @LawInSport: https://t.co/BNHYGnRk2B.

Some interesting passages from Lord Justice Sedley's judgment in Redmond-Bate v DPP (1999) 163 JP 789. When arresting to prevent a breach of the peace, the “critical question ... is where the threat is coming from, because it is there that the preventive action must be directed”.

But, I'm sure Parliamentarians will want to scrutinise the bill closely, given that it radically rewrites our constitutional settlement in respect of this policy and adopts what one judge once called a "humpty dumpty" approach to law. 12/12

I'm sure some will still find a way to say the bill does not go far enough (given that some limited potential for individual access to justice is preserved). 11/

Then finally, the Strasbourg-stopper provision. Last time a flight was halted, it was because of an "interim measure" from the European Court. Those didn't bind in domestic law anyway, but the bill goes further: domestic courts may not even look at them. 10/

There's also a striking restriction on the court's power to grant an "interim remedy" (ie, an order to hold the ring and prevent a plane taking off while a challenge is heard). The bar is placed very high: real, imminent, foreseeable risk of serious, irreversible harm. 9/

The the bill says: gvt the court can consider whether Rwanda is safe *for a particular person*, based on their circumstances. But, they still cannot take into account whether Rwanda will illegally send the person to an unsafe country (the key part of the SC judgment). 8/

But, notably, the bill does *not* disapply section 4 of the Human Rights Act 1998, which empowers the court to declare a statute incompatible with Convention Rights (while leaving it on the statute book). So does the gvt still want the court fight, for the optics? 7/

The bits of the HRA that are ditched are interesting: - the duty to have regard to Strasbourg case law - the duty to interpret statutes (incl this one), so far as possible, compatibly with Convention rights - the duty on public authorities not to breach those rights. 6/

The SoS can't certify the bill as compatible with Convention rights. That's unsurprising, but also suggests the gvt doesn't back its own position that the new treaty deals with all the human rights issues the court identified: if it did, thus stuff would be unnecessary. 5/

And thirdly, that applies notwithstanding any other rule of domestic or international law, including (to some extent) the Human Rights Act - more on that in a moment. 4/

Secondly, the section further bolsters that duty by providing that a curt must not even "consider" any challenge to the SoS's decision on the basis that Rwanda is not safe, or that it will not fulfil its obligations under the treaty. 3/

Section 2 deems Rwanda to be safe as a matter of law, regardless of the facts. There are three strings to its bow. First, both the government and the court "must treat" Rwanda as safe. 2/

The draft bill is extraordinary. Section 1 (trumpeting the deal, parliamentary sovereignty, etc) is guff, but the... interesting provisions are those in sections 2-5. 1/ https://t.co/gRfWIFmGlm

Second, if not: is the gvt prepared to do it anyway? That would mean: a. legislation to override the laws that the SC was applying (i.e. the tip-ex solution), and b. disregard any rulings from the European Court of Human Rights that the scheme is unlawful, in breach of intl law.

From a legal perspective, that leaves the government with two questions. First, can ministers show that, in addition to new promises/procedural safeguard(s) briefed out as part of the treaty, there are practical measures that will turn Rwanda from an unsafe into a safe country?

A monitoring committee to assess Rwanda’s compliance: that is an incentive for Rwanda to comply, sure, but again: the SC said you need to look beyond incentives, at practical realities.

A new “appeal body” to consider individual appeals: that will help to address the SC’s concerns about process, but the weakness of appeal was only one strand of a much wider-ranging analysis about the grim practical realities of the Rwandan asylum system.

What does the new deal do to address those concerns? A commitment not to send people to unsafe countries: fine, but the SC said: “Intentions and aspirations do not necessarily correspond to reality: the question is whether they are achievable in practice.”

a. poor human rights situation there, b. inadequate asylum system including perfunctory process/biddable judiciary, near 100% rejection rates, past practice of sending ppl to unsafe countries, officials’ misunderstandings of refugee law, c. failure of a similar deal with Israel.