Bottom line: has anyone come close to cracking RSA-2048 with quantum? Not really – it’s still a theoretical threat, not a today threat. The “48-bit factoring” hype taught us two things: (1) some creative hybrid approaches might reduce the qubit requirements a bit, but (2) claims.

Don’t rely on manual, interview-based cryptographic inventories – they’re usually incomplete and give a false sense of security. Many orgs start by sending spreadsheets for teams to list crypto usage; it feels like progress but often misses hidden crypto in code, libraries, and.

The race for quantum advantage is as much about brains as qubits. Companies and governments are scrambling to attract and train quantum specialists. We’re seeing quantum computing courses, hackathons, even high-school outreach pop up. This article highlights creative solutions:.

So what problems are quantum computers actually good at? Google’s 2019 “quantum supremacy” experiment was a stunt (53 qubits did in 200 seconds what they claimed a supercomputer would need 10,000 years for). But beyond bragging rights, quantum computers shine in specific areas:.

Key point: don’t rely on just asking people where crypto is used – they won’t know all of it. Crypto is in so many layers (OS, apps, dependencies) that only a thorough, tool-assisted approach works. This guide even suggests a project plan (prep → scope → tool selection → pilot.

Quantum computing is being called the “skeleton key” of the digital world – a master key that could unlock nearly all of today’s encrypted data. In other words, a sufficiently powerful quantum computer poses a universal cyber threat more serious than anything before. Boards and.

Extraordinary claims need extraordinary evidence. The 2022 claim of factoring 48-bit RSA with a small quantum computer (using Schnorr’s lattice algorithm + QAOA) was extraordinary. By early 2025, that approach hadn’t been replicated at larger scale, and some flaws/limitations.

You can’t secure what you can’t see. Thankfully, a growing ecosystem of tools (from IBM’s CBOM framework to startups like SandboxAQ’s scanners) can map out all your organization’s cryptography. This article surveys leading cryptographic inventory solutions – static code.

The global race in quantum tech has very different playbooks. China: government-driven, massive state funding (>50% of global public quantum spend) – leading in papers & patents, building national labs and quantum satellites. US: market-driven, VC and Big Tech lead, far more.

Boards: quantum risk isn’t just a tech problem – it’s a governance issue. Regulators increasingly hold boards accountable for cyber risks, and that extends to quantum threats. A future quantum breach could lead to major liability. Smart executives are asking their CISOs today:.

CBOM (Cryptography Bill of Materials) is the new buzzword. Think SBOM but for encryption. IBM’s approach uses static analysis to list all algorithms/keys (your CBOM) and dynamic monitoring to see them in action. Why does it matter? Because to migrate to #PQC, you first need a.

Quantum readiness isn’t just future-proofing – it’s a chance to fix lingering security debt. By embarking on a PQC migration, you finally fund that full cryptographic inventory (you can’t protect what you don’t know you have) and clean up “crypto junk” (weak algorithms, expired.

Quantum tech will both attack and defend cybersecurity. On offense: a future quantum computer can break today’s encryption (hence “Q-Day” fears) and even Grover’s algorithm could weaken symmetric crypto. On defense: we have new toys like Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) – already.

The clock is ticking on current encryption. Experts estimate we may be ~5 years away from quantum machines that threaten common cryptography  – and maybe ~2030 for the “Q-Day” when quantum code-breaking becomes reality. Whether it’s 5 or 15 years, organizations must start.

Step 1 for #QuantumReadiness: inventory ALL your cryptography. Sounds simple, but in practice it’s a massive undertaking. This article makes it clear: cryptography is deeply embedded and often hidden in hardware, firmware, software layers. Identifying every algorithm, library,.

Harvest Now, Decrypt Later is the big near-term threat: hackers can record your encrypted traffic now and decrypt it when they get a quantum computer. This piece discusses that and other vectors – reinforcing why migrating to #PQC and using hybrid encryption schemes in the.

Quantum readiness isn’t just future-proofing – it’s a chance to fix lingering security debt. By embarking on a PQC migration, you finally fund that full cryptographic inventory (you can’t protect what you don’t know you have) and clean up “crypto junk” (weak algorithms, expired.

Coding a quantum computer isn’t like coding a classical one. This intro for developers explains the paradigm shift: instead of deterministic bits, you have qubits in superposition and you program by manipulating probability amplitudes. Outputs are probabilistic, so you run your.

Don’t assume people know everywhere crypto is used. Crypto often runs invisibly in the background of apps and OS, so even developers and system owners might not realize all the crypto operations happening. This piece lists flaws of manual inventories (human error, lack of deep.

Harvest Now, Decrypt Later – aka “Steal now, crack when you can” – is the quantum threat that’s here today. Adversaries (think nation-states) are likely collecting encrypted data now in hopes of decrypting it once quantum computers mature. Why does that matter? Because any.