Steven Galbraith
@EllipticKiwi
Followers
4K
Following
21K
Media
343
Statuses
5K
Mathematics of public key cryptography. No longer a user of this site.
Auckland, New Zealand
Joined August 2015
One week to go until the online event Celebrating 40 years of Elliptic Curves in Cryptography (ECC). You can hear from Koblitz and Miller about their work 40 years ago https://t.co/62oEE0Exx8
0
12
51
ECC 2025 11 August 2025, online Celebrating 40 years of Elliptic Curves in Cryptography (ECC) https://t.co/62oEE0F5mG
0
16
42
Tuesday, December 10, University of Auckland "The mathematics of solitaire" Public lecture by Persi Diaconis who is not only a mathematician and statistician but a professional magician Book now to reserve a seat. These are going to go fast. https://t.co/8tPV29BOQ9
eventbrite.co.nz
This public lecture is presented by Persi Diaconis who is not only a mathematician and statistician but a professional magician
0
3
7
If you are coming to the joint meeting of the New Zealand, Australian, and American math societies in 9 days, then here is a photo of the conference dinner venue
0
1
9
Tuesday, December 10, University of Auckland "The mathematics of solitaire" Public lecture by Persi Diaconis who is not only a mathematician and statistician but a professional magician Book now to reserve a seat. These are going to go fast. https://t.co/8tPV29BOQ9
eventbrite.co.nz
This public lecture is presented by Persi Diaconis who is not only a mathematician and statistician but a professional magician
0
3
7
@mr_poivron @dallairedemers @hashbreaker There are alternative proposals for public key encryption which I discuss in that survey (including one I made). But I think it’s fair to say that none of them, isogenies included, has received enough study to have confidence in it.
3
2
3
While crypto experts are scrutinizing every detail of the new paper, as a precautionary measure we strongly advise everyone to temporarily switch all your digital communications to pigeon post.
7
11
115
PKC 24 program is up, and registration open! with great papers, awesome invited talks from @sol3gga and @nadiaheninger, exotic excursion and cruise banquet, and the lovely little logo @Wsusilo, see you in Sydney~
pkc.iacr.org
Public Key Cryptography
2
12
33
Just read in the LMS Newsletter: Nelson Stephens and Dominic Welsh have both died. Two mathematicians whose work was crucial to my initial career development. Nelson for being my PhD external examiner and mentor at Cardiff, and Dominic for his lovely book on cryptography
3
1
17
We give a much simpler and tighter reduction, that only needs 1/\eps^4 calls to the CDH oracle. We build heavily on the work of Montgomery and Zhandry, but replace the most tricky parts with a much simpler statistical distinguisher. (4/5)
0
1
1
In 2018 L Panny, B Smith, F Vercauteren and I showed a quantum reduction of DLog to CDH for group actions, for a perfect correct CDH oracle. This arises from CSIDH key exchange: breaking the key exchange is equivalent to (quantumly) solving the group action problem. (2/5)
0
1
1
SIS estimates have landed in https://t.co/U5AKkaQuhf thanks to Hunter Kippen (who is not on this website) who did this work during his residency with us at @SandboxAQ
github.com
An attempt at a new LWE estimator. Contribute to malb/lattice-estimator development by creating an account on GitHub.
1
12
47
This is a graph of Taxpayers Union income and cash reserves over time. There was a really really big surge of money coming in from 2020. I wonder what the reason was and where the money came from?
114
53
230
Right-wingers finding out that Greenday hates them is like when they found out that Rage Against The Machine hates them, which was like when they found out that Neil Young & Bruce Springsteen hate them, which was like when they found out that their wives & kids hate them, which w
460
6K
47K
It feels very anticlimactic, given that a number of governments have been working for years to stop or slow down this deployment. Universal deployment of end-to-end feels basically unstoppable at this point.
2
4
35
@heydari_be Yes only requires about O(2n) FAULT TOLERANT qubits to break n-bit RSA. But it is making each qubit fault tolerant which is the problem. That requires quantum error correction, which is expensive (or at least it was last time I read some stuff on this).
0
2
11